Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi (left) shaking hands with Indonesian
President Joko Widodo, in Myanmar on Nov. 13. (EPA Photo/Bagus Indahono)
Writing for The Diplomat magazine, scholar Sourabh Jyoti Sharma this year argued
that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations must formulate a common
policy on the Indian Ocean region as part of its future maritime
strategy. By the same token, Indonesia can be said to have neglected its
diplomacy towards this region.
Despite Indonesia’s membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) since its inception in 1995, this forum is yet to play an
integral part in the country’s diplomatic endeavors.
President Joko Widodo’s maritime axis, if and when it comes into
being, will only increase the strategic value of the Indian Ocean as a
gateway for maritime communication, transport, trade and military
routes.
Both IORA and its initiative, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IORARC), could potentially become a strategic
balancing force in the years ahead, if Indonesia is to pursue a more
diversified foreign policy. The Indian Ocean community includes both
India and Australia, both of which would be more than happy to forge
closer ties with Indonesia.
So the Indian Ocean community is an alternative foreign policy axis
to either Beijing or Washington. As major powers in the region, India,
Indonesia and Australia have the definite potential to bring equilibrium
to the larger Indo-Pacific arena by working more closely together
through both IORA and IORARC.
Unfortunately, the IORA-IORARC is currently underdeveloped and
underused as a regional forum. India made the effort to empower the
association by donating $1 million to its Special Fund in 2011, when it
was chair. However, much greater efforts by the member states are
obviously required to make the forum count internationally.
Australia now holds the IORARC chair until 2015. By a happy
coincidence, the chair will be taken up by Indonesia the following year.
This will provide the Indonesian government an opportunity to lead the
initiative to empower the forum further.
The fact that IORARC is underdeveloped also means there is plenty of
room for bold and far-reaching initiatives by member states. If managed
properly, with member states giving it their full support, IORARC even
has the capacity to become a countervailing network for China’s latest
Maritime Silk Road initiative.
Due to Indonesia’s own limited resources, it is highly unrealistic to
continue to devote our diplomatic efforts to too many countries at the
same time. It is therefore imperative that we choose the right strategic
partners that will help ensure maximum benefits to ourselves while
allowing us to raise our own international profile at the same time.
It is difficult to imagine this could be achieved with China as our
main strategic partner. China, burdened by its own Middle-Kingdom
complex, is unlikely to accept a more-or-less equal partnership with
Indonesia. Its latest Maritime Silk Road scheme, sometimes dubbed as
China’s Marshall Plan, clearly places China as the regional nexus.
Its overwhelmingly superior economic and military advantage alone
should alert us to the danger of Indonesia being relegated to a
subservient status. The recent disparity of treatment between the three
Vietnamese illegal fishing boats that were seized and 22 Chinese fishing
vessels points in this direction. The Vietnamese vessels have been
sunk, while it remains unclear what is going to happen to the Chinese
vessels.
Nevertheless, Indonesia, as all other nations on earth, cannot afford
to ignore China altogether. It is palpably true that Indonesia needs
Chinese investment and goodwill to forge ahead with its development
plans.
The key here is balance, in the sense that Indonesia’s relations with
other countries should provide opportunities and yet leave us not
overly beholden to one power above the others. Cordial bilateral
relations with China are essential for Indonesia. By the same token, we
also needs to nurture our own relations with the other regional powers
in the Indian Ocean community, notably India and Australia.
Out of the two, India is arguably the more acceptable strategic
partner on the domestic front. India’s positive, albeit low-profile,
image in the Indonesian media as well as resurging nostalgia about the
Sukarno early years, mean that most Indonesians would not see an
alliance with India as something suspicious.
Culturally, India’s soft power in the form of Bollywood movies and
popular TV programs is something to which many Indonesians can relate.
The Indian diaspora community in the country could also be instrumental
in bolstering relations between the two nations.
Australia, on the other hand, has been perceived as a junior partner
of the United States in the Anglosphere alliance. What most Indonesian
nationalists allergic to the West forget, however, is that Australia has
its own regional interests to safeguard: its relationship with
Indonesia, and now increasingly with India, is of paramount importance.
So to dismiss Australia as a useful partner would also be a folly of
the highest order. In any strategic alliance framework involving the
Indian Ocean region, Australia is indispensible. Its alliance with the
US means its armed forces have had valuable combat experience, something
that the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) lack.
IORARC is a regional forum that Indonesia can help develop, should we
wish to ensure our own strategic interests in both the near and distant
future.
Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya. Contact him at johannes@nonacris.com.
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar